Putin’s North Korea Visit: China’s Calculus

China’s minimal media coverage of Putin’s 18-19 June visit to North Korea reflects Beijing’s calculus that closer Russia-DPRK cooperation is complicating China’s security environment. Most of China’s state media reporting relayed foreign coverage without any official Chinese government commentary regarding the significance of the event. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s trip to North Korea marked his first visit to the DPRK in 24 years. 

When asked about Putin’s visit on 21 June, China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “The cooperation between Russia and DPRK is a matter between two sovereign states” and refused further comment.

Closer Russia-DPRK relations has some benefits for Beijing:

• Benefit 1: Cooperation between Russia and DPRK in teaming up against the West and specifically the United States serves China’s geostrategic interests of supporting Russia’s involvement in the Korean peninsula as a counterweight to US regional influence.
• Benefit 2: Putin also brought DPRK on board to China’s idea of opening a new sea route for the Tumen River Delta region of China’s landlocked Jilin and Heilongjiang provinces through Russia and DPRK territories. This arrangement would greatly promote economic progress in China’s northeast rust-belt region, Russia’s Far East, and northern DPRK. 

Pamir assesses that Beijing has three major concerns over growing Russia-DPRK relations:

Concern 1: China’s influence on DPRK will decline. 

China is the DPRK’s most important economic partner. Although it is difficult to determine exactly how much economic and military aid China provides to the DPRK, it is estimated that more than 80% of DPRK’s foreign trade is with China. China Customs data, even taken at face value, showed China exported RMB14.12B (~$2.02B) goods to DPRK in 2023, up 151.9% YOY; and imported RMB2.058B (~$0.29B) from the DPRK, up 127.1% YOY.

However, Beijing’s political influence over Pyongyang has always been tenuous. North Korea is particularly displeased with China’s position on denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and China’s relations with South Korea. 

• Over the last twenty years, China has been South Korea’s largest trading partner. In 2023, China-South Korea trade exceeded $310B. 
• On 26-27 May 2024, China’s Premier Li Qiang held a trilateral meeting in Seoul with his South Korean and Japanese counterparts. The meeting’s joint statement reaffirmed the position of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. 
• DPRK issued a statement, denouncing this affirmation as “a political provocation” and violating DPRK’s constitution. On 18 June, the day of Putin’s arrival in Pyongyang, China and South Korea held their first diplomatic and military (2+2) dialogue in nine years. 

The DPRK’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership (CSP) treaty with Russia gives Pyongyang more confidence and capital to be more adventurous and politically defiant towards Beijing.

Concern 2: The possibility of a de-nuclearized Korean Peninsula is increasingly remote. 

Beijing has repeatedly stated that a nuclear Korean Peninsula at its doorstep is not in China’s security interests. After North Korea tested its first nuclear weapon in 2006, China joined a series of UN sanctions against North Korea. However, DPRK’s subsequent nuclear tests and tensions between Pyongyang and Seoul have increased the plausibility of nuclear confrontation on the Peninsula. 

• In January 2023, South Korea’s President Yoon Suk-yeol floated the idea of the country developing its own nuclear weapons. Yoon is wary of the DPRK’s growing nuclear arsenal and the sophistication of its nuclear weapons, as well as unsure of US nuclear commitment towards South Korea.

• In April 2023, the US and South Korea signed the Washington Declaration. Under this agreement, the US will periodically deploy nuclear-armed submarines and other nuclear-capable assets to South Korea and involve South Korea in its nuclear planning. In return, South Korea agrees to not develop nuclear weapons.
• In September 2023, the DPRK amended its constitution to enshrine the country’s nuclear policy. 

• In November 2023, the US and South Korea signed a Tailored Deterrence Strategy. The agreement spelled out how South Korea could assist US nuclear operations in the event of a DPRK attack. 

Although the US and South Korea said their agreements were designed to deter the DPRK, China criticized the US-South Korea arrangements as “deliberately stirring up tension, provoking confrontation, and playing up threats.” 

In China’s view, the agreements moved US nuclear capability closer to China. This move comes at a time when US-China relations are deteriorating, and Beijing fears a US intervention in a Taiwan contingency. 

Though China maintains its position of a denuclearized Korean Peninsula, it has stopped publicly criticizing DPRK’s nuclear development. China also abstained from voting for the UN Security Council’s resolution (28 March 2024) to reauthorize a panel of experts to monitor the DPRK’s UN sanction compliance. 

• Chinese analysts believe the Russia-DPRK CSP treaty bolstered DPRK’s nuclear determination. DPRK could resume its nuclear tests – its last test was in September 2017.

China also fears that the US could redeploy its tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea – the US withdrew its last tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea in December 1991 after more than 30 years of deployment. 

• On 29 May 2024, US Senator Roger Wicker (R-Mississippi), the highest-ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services Committee, published a defense buildup plan which includes redeploying nuclear weapons in South Korea. 
• After Putin’s visit to the DPRK, Wicker urged consideration of his plan. China’s embassy in Washington said the US idea of redeploying nuclear weapons in South Korea is “very dangerous” and such action will “gravely upset the security of countries in the Asia-Pacific region.”

Concern 3: Tensions in Northeast Asia will likely escalate. 

South Korea, Japan, and the US responded strongly against the Russia-DPRK CSP treaty. Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington expressed concerns over the adverse impact of the Russia-DPRK treaty on regional stability and security. 

South Korea’s response: On 18 June, a spokesperson for South Korea’s president criticized the Russia-DPRK treaty as a threat to its security and a serious violation of UN sanction resolutions. Seoul lodged a diplomatic protest to Russia’s ambassador and urged Russia to “immediately halt” its military cooperation with DPRK. 

• South Korea added 243 items to its list of goods banned to export to Russia, bringing the list to 1,402. Seoul also said it was considering arming Ukraine. So far, South Korea has only provided humanitarian aid to Ukraine. South Korea also stated that it would further strengthen security arrangements with the US and Japan.

• On 20 June, responding to South Korea’s threat to arm Ukraine, Putin said that would be “a very big mistake.” He threatened, “If this happens, then we will also make appropriate decisions, which are unlikely to please the current leadership of South Korea.”

Japan’s response: On 19 June, Japan’s chief cabinet secretary said Japan was “seriously concerned” about the Russia-DPRK treaty and Japan’s security environment “is increasingly severe”. On the same day, the visiting chief of Japan’s foreign ministry for European affairs delivered the same message of concern to Moscow. Russia’s foreign ministry said Japan’s recent decision to expand its export ban list for Russia is “another step toward the complete destruction of [Russia-Japan] bilateral relations.” 

US response: The US State Department said, “Deepening cooperation between Russia and the DPRK is a trend that should be of great concern to anyone interested in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, upholding the global non-proliferation regime, abiding by UN Security Council resolutions, and supporting the people of Ukraine.” 

• The White House expressed the same concern. Secretary of State Blinken said the new Russia-DPRK pact posed a “serious threat” to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and the US will consider “various measures” in response. 

Some Chinese analysts believe the Russia-DPRK CSP treaty will result in more US-South Korea-Japan military joint operations in the region. 

• On 22 June, the US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt docked at South Korea’s Busan Naval Base for a joint military exercise with South Korea and Japan. South Korea’s Navy said the arrival of the US carrier “demonstrates the strong combined defense posture” of the three countries and “their firm resolve to respond to the escalating threats from North Korea.” 

Security and Economic Impact of Russia-DPRK CSP Treaty

The Russia-DPRK CSP treaty gives the US an excuse to bring other international allies to the region. Consequently, an “Asian NATO” could become a reality. Beijing perceives that closer cooperation between Russia and North Korea poses heightened geopolitical risk in China’s security environment. 

According to the treaty published by DPRK state media KCNA, Article 4 of the treaty stipulates that should either party of the treaty “get into a state of war due to an armed aggression, the other “shall immediately provide military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.” 

• Putin said, “This is a true breakthrough document, reflecting the desire of the two countries not to rest on their laurels, but to raise our relations to a new qualitative level.” Kim Jong Un said, “Our two countries’ relations have been elevated to the new higher level of an alliance.”

For Russia, under the CSP treaty, the DPRK will increase its military support to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Kim expressed to Putin his “unconditional support [for] all of Russia’s policies”, including Russia’s war in Ukraine. 

• US intelligence believes DPRK has already provided large amounts of ammunition and short-range missiles to Russia. Some western analysts speculated that DPRK could provide manpower to Russia’s defense industry. 

For the DPRK, the CSP gives Pyongyang more strategic confidence in North Korea’s confrontation with South Korea and its allies. In a press statement in Pyongyang, Putin said, under the CSP, Russia “does not rule out developing military and technical cooperation with the DPRK.” 

• International analysts believe Russia has already provided DPRK some key military technologies. Under the CSP, Russia could allow more military technology transfers to DPRK, such as those related to intercontinental ballistic missiles, nuclear submarines, satellites, and even nuclear weapons. Putin said in Pyongyang that DPRK has all the rights to “take all reasonable measures” to defend itself.

Before his arrival to North Korea, the DPRK state newspaper, Rodong Simum, published a letter from Putin, stating that Russia and DPRK would work together to fight the “unilateral and illegal” UN sanctions. A large group of senior Russian government officials in charge of economic affairs and top executives from Russian companies accompanied Putin to North Korea. 

• The two countries signed several agreements on cooperation in agriculture, energy, healthcare, telecommunications, infrastructure, and transportation, and agreed to pay for their economic interactions in barter trade to avoid the settlement system in the West. 
• Putin and Kim want to use these agreements and arrangements to undermine the economic sanctions imposed on them by the UN and the West. 

On 28 March 2024, Russia vetoed the UN Security Council resolution to reauthorize an experts panel to monitor DPRK’s UN sanction compliance. It is speculated that Russia will provide oil, food, technologies, etc. to North Korea in exchange for North Korean military supplies, raw materials, and labor.

• According to Chinese reporting, Russia-DPRK trade was $3.78M in 2022. In the first ten months of 2023, their bilateral trade went up to $29M. In the first five months of 2024, it climbed 54% YOY.