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China’s Position on Hamas-Israel War

22 April 2024
China’s Position on Hamas-Israel War
3 min read

On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched a major terrorist attack against Israel. Israel retaliated with massive military actions in Gaza, which have resulted in huge civilian casualties and a humanitarian crisis. As the Hamas-Israel war escalated, China took a seemingly neutral position by refusing to denounce Hamas but stating instead that China opposes attacks on civilians by any party. 

China’s Foreign Ministry statements have consistently conveyed three key themes: 

  • Israel’s military response has exceeded the scope of self-defense and Israel should stop “collective punishment” against Gaza civilians. 
  • “The root cause of today’s tragedy is that the fundamental rights and interests of the Palestinian people have been neglected for too long.”
  • Only by implementing a “true two-state solution” can peace be achieved in the Middle East. 

China’s pro-Palestine position reflects historical roots, Chinese domestic governance, and Beijing’s geopolitical calculations. 

Historical Roots 

China has always been a strong supporter of Palestine. Supporting Palestine served China’s policy of opposing the West during the Cold War and building support from Arab and Muslim countries and more broadly, Global South countries. 

  • In 1965, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) set up its office in Beijing. In 1988, China was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Palestine. Over the years, China has always sided with Palestine in the UN and other international forums. 
  • China’s engagement with Palestine is mostly with the PLO-led Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. PLO leader Yasser Arafat visited China 14 times. Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, Arafat’s successor, visited China five times – three of the five visits took place after Chinese President XI Jinping took office in 2012. 

Understanding the PLO-Hamas feud, China maintained distance from Hamas since its inception 1987. In 2006, after Hamas won the Palestinian legislative election, China recognized it as “a representative of the Palestinian people” and set up a liaison office in Gaza.  

Domestic Governance   

China has over 30 million Muslims. China perceives that it faces challenges from “three hostile forces” among its Muslim population, particularly in Xinjiang – namely separatismextremism, and terrorism

No Muslim country has supported these alleged “hostile” forces in China. Beijing is concerned that bad relations with Muslim countries will increase governance challenges in its Muslim-dominated areas like Xinjiang and Ningxia. 

  • In June 2023, Palestinian President Abbas visited China and signed a “strategic partnership” with Beijing. Abbas stated that the Xinjiang issue is not a human rights issue, but rather, China’s effort to fight terrorism and separatism. Abbas added, Palestine opposes the West using the Xinjiang issue to “interfere in China’s internal affairs.”

Geopolitical Calculations       

China believes the world order established after World War II is dominated by and benefits US interests specifically and more broadly, the interests of the West. Consequently, China seeks to establish a new world order. One key aspect of China’s vision for a new world order is “sovereignty over human rights,” which is epitomized by China’s advocacy that governments should abide by the principle of “non-interference” in the internal affairs of other countries. China’s advocacy has great appeal in nearly all Arab and Muslim countries. 

  • Arab countries have not denounced Hamas, and China has not denounced Hamas' attacks on Israel. China needs Arab stakeholders to support its vision of a new world order. 

At the same time, China has maintained a generally positive relationship with Israel since the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949. 

  • On 9 January 1950, Israel became the first country in the Middle East to recognize the People's Republic of China. However, with the outbreak of the Korean War and the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union, China-Israel relations were stalled. Siding with the Soviet Union, China perceived Israel as a “running dog of US imperialism."
  • After Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978, and with the improvement of China-US relations, China changed its policy towards Israel, as demonstrated by China’s cessation of military aid to Palestine. 
  • In 1992, China and Israel established diplomatic relations and offered each other Most Favored Nation status. China became Israel’s largest Asian trading partner and second largest trading partner in the world after the US. Bilateral trade increased from $50 million in 1992 to the peak of $25.4 billion in 2022. China also participated in some infrastructure developments in Israel. 
  • In 2015, China invested $1.7 billion to build a new port facility in Haifa. The facility was completed in September 2021 and Israel leased it to China for 25 years. Israel also became a major source of high-tech imports for China. The two countries have a joint commission for technology cooperation. 

As US-China tensions escalated, China strengthened relations with Iran. Under US pressure, Israel banned several high-tech exports to China. Consequently, the China-Israel technology cooperation regime came to a halt. In 2021, Israel set up a foreign investment security review board. Chinese investments in Israel are the main target of the review. 

China is trying to play a bigger role in the Middle East to foster its vision of a new world order and to diversify its economic interests to better insulate itself from potential isolation by the West. 

  • For example, China’s trade with the Gulf States in 2022 was $315.8 billion. The Gulf States are now a major energy supplier for China. In March 2023, China mediated a diplomatic thaw between Saudi Arabia and Iran. 
  • After the Hamas-Israel war broke out, China’s special envoy for Middle East affairs shuttled among various capitals in the region. China’s ambition to expand the BRICS organization to include countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and UAE is meeting with some success.
  • Beijing seeks to expand its limited role in the region by inserting itself in major regional issues, such as promoting a “two-state” solution, which is “at the core of the Middle East issue,” as China’s Foreign Minister WANG Yi stated on 13 October 2023. 
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